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WA L T E R SI N N O T T-AR M S T R O N G,
ADINA ROSKIES, TENEILLE BROWN,
AND EMILY MURPHY
BRAIN IMAGES AS LEGAL EVIDENCE

ABSTRACT

This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as evidence in
criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which weighs probative value
against the danger of being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact ﬁnders.
The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research relevant to these
issues. We argue that currently the probative value of neuroimages for criminal
responsibility is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to be
prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments that will directly assess
how jurors are inﬂuenced by brain images.

Brain images are becoming more and more common in courts. Feigenson (2006)
found 130 reported opinions involving PET and/or SPECT evidence but only
2 reported opinions citing fMRI evidence. Helen Mayberg, however, has served
as an expert witness in over 50 trials in recent years, many of them involving
fMRI evidence, and a number of judges have informally told us that evidence from
neuroscience, including fMRI, has become standard in capital sentencing.
Some lawyers and neuroscientists are critical of this trend. A few have even
suggested in conversation a temporary moratorium on brain images as legal
evidence in criminal trials, except possibly in capital sentencing.
This paper will explore the prospects for some uses of data from brain imaging
in the courts. Whether brain images should be admitted into trials depends, of
course, on how probative they are for speciﬁc legal issues and on whether they
are likely to mislead fact-ﬁnders in trials. We will address these topics in turn after
illustrating the variety of uses of brain images in law.
1. W H A T C O U L D B R A I N I M A G E S B E L E G A L E V I D E N C E F O R ?

Brain images could conceivably be used for many diﬀerent purposes within the
legal system. Neuroscientiﬁc studies involving structural or functional brain images
DOI: 10.3366/E1742360008000452
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might, for example, be used to argue for or against certain legislation or prison
policies. They might also be used to justify predictions of misbehavior in parole
hearings. We will, however, focus on the use of functional brain images in courts.
One proposed use of functional brain images in trials is for mind-reading. When
brain scans are used to detect lies or deception, for example, they are supposed
to detect whether a person has a mental state of belief in what they say. A few
companies (Cephos and NoLieMRI) already oﬀer methods of lie detection using
fMRI. Although their results are uncompelling to date, EEG data were admitted
as evidence against lying in 2001 by Iowa District Court Judge Tim O’Grady in the
case of Terry Harrington. Brain images might also be introduced as evidence of
mental states other than deception, such as bias in jurors, consciousness in cases of
end of life issues, and pain and suﬀering in tort plaintiﬀs or applicants for disability
beneﬁts.
Another possibility is to introduce brain images as evidence not of temporary
mental states but of more stable mental traits or capacities. Mental capacities
might be relevant to competence to stand trial or to be executed or they might
be relevant to criminal responsibility if they involve incapacities to gain requisite
knowledge or to form requisite intentions that are part of the mens rea of most
crimes. Neuroscience might also become relevant to whether adolescents and
people with brain damage lack substantial capacity to conform their conduct to
the law or whether psychopaths, for example, lack substantial capacity to appreciate
wrongfulness. Evidence of such capacities might be relevant to an insanity defense,
in the guilt phase, or in the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.
This list of potential uses is incomplete, but it gives some sense of the wide
range of possible uses of neuroscientiﬁc evidence in legal trials. Many of these
uses are speculative, and they need not all be treated alike. Each proposed use of
neuroscientiﬁc evidence needs to be assessed carefully in context and on its own.
For the sake of simplicity, we will focus here on functional brain images used by
the defense in a criminal trial to reduce responsibility. These uses might occur in
the guilt phase to challenge an element of the crime charged, in an insanity defense,
or in the sentencing phase to argue for a lighter sentence.
2. L E G A L S TA N D A R D S O F E V I D E N C E

Whatever legal issue is at stake, to introduce a brain image as evidence in a legal trial,
either side needs to meet standards for demonstrative evidence (such as exhibits) as
well as standards for scientiﬁc expert testimony. The testimony is needed in order
to interpret the images during the trial. Although it would also be important to
ask when neuroscientists (especially cognitive neuroscientists) meet requirements
for expert testimony, we will restrict our discussion here to whether or when
functional brain images may be admitted under the rules governing demonstrative
evidence.
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Most courts follow something like the Federal Rules of Evidence:
FRE 401: “relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
FRE 403: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

To apply FRE 403 to brain images in criminal trials, courts must answer three
central questions: (1) How probative for criminal responsibility is the brain image?
(2) How dangerous (that is, prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or needless) is the
brain image? (3) Does its danger substantially outweigh its probative value?
To answer these questions, we need to understand, ﬁrst, how brain images are
constructed. Only then can we determine their probative value and whether they
confuse or mislead.
3. W H A T I S A B R A I N I M A G E ?

There are many types of brain images, but usually the term refers to images derived
from noninvasive techniques for measuring structural or functional properties of
the brain. A number of such techniques exist, including PET, SPECT, MEG, DTI,
structural MRI, and functional MRI (fMRI). We will focus here on fMRI, though
our main points will apply as well to other functional brain imaging techniques.
The most commonly used fMRI techniques measure changes in the ratio of
oxygenated to deoxygenated blood (the BOLD signal). This signal is closely related
to blood ﬂow and bears a complicated relation to neural activity. These relations
are well-documented although not yet completely understood.
Inferences about brain activity are typically made by designing experiments that
contrast the MR signal measured during two diﬀerent tasks. Ideally, the tasks diﬀer
in one respect, and the location and magnitude of the diﬀerence in measured signal
is attributed to brain activity involved in the diﬀerence in task performance. For
instance, one task might involve processes A-E, and another may involve processes
A-D but not E. The diﬀerence in signal is thus interpreted to be involved in process
E. In practice, there are almost always a number of diﬀerences among the tasks.
With enough psychological sophistication, these can be modeled, although they
are not always easily assessed. There are also many minor diﬀerences across trials
while performing the same task, such as diﬀerences in processing individual stimuli;
and the signal itself is noisy. When enough stimuli are presented, these minor
diﬀerences will wash out in the statistics. The diﬀerence in MR signal between task
conditions is usually quite small, often less than 1%, but with enough data even
such small diﬀerences can be statistically signiﬁcant.
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The discovered diﬀerence in MR signal is often presented as a brain image.
These images are usually constructed by superimposing colored pixels on a
grey-scale picture of a standard brain in order to indicate where signal was higher
(usually red or yellow) or lower (usually blue) than in a contrast state. The resulting
fMRI images look something like photographs, but they are not photographs.
Instead, they are constructions from highly abstract numerical data about magnetic
properties. Brain activity and blood ﬂow are not brightly colored, and the brain
does not really “light up” when active. It is important to bear in mind that
brain images are simply a vivid way to represent the location and magnitude of
statistical diﬀerences in signal across large data sets. (For more detail, see Roskies
2007, 2008.)
4. A R E B R A I N S C A N S P R O B AT I V E O F C R I M I N A L
RESPONSIBILITY?

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly deﬁne probative value. However,
one standard, respected textbook deﬁnes probative value as degree of relevance:
Remember that evidence is “relevant” if it has “any” tendency to make the fact of
consequence more or less probable; probative value measures the strength of the
eﬀect on the probabilities, even if only in general terms like “highly,” “somewhat,” or
“minimally” probative. (Allen et al. 2006, 135)

This account makes probative value equivalent to a relative conditional probability.
We doubt that the issue is this simple, because values enter into the equation in
ways that we will see. Still, a good starting point for assessing the probative value
of any evidence is to ask how much the evidence increases the probability of some
fact that matters.
To apply this standard to brain images, we need to consider the precise nature
of the information that is presented in the image and also which fact the image is
supposed to be evidence for. This is an immensely complex topic. Here we can
only run through ﬁve main problems that arise when trying to use brain images as
evidence of facts that are relevant to criminal responsibility.
4.1 Normality
First, brain images are sometimes oﬀered to show that a particular defendant is
abnormal in some way that is claimed to remove or reduce criminal responsibility.
The notion of normality, however, is dubious when based on functional brain
images. Most neuroscientiﬁc studies using fMRI report group averages, but
individual functional proﬁles can vary so much that it is not unusual for most
individuals to diﬀer from the group average.
This point is made graphically in Figure 1 from Miller et al. (2002). In this study,
subjects SC, JL, and BK look very far from the group average, and subjects EE
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Figure 1. An axial view of glass brain representations of signiﬁcant activations associated
with episodic retrieval for each of 9 subjects. On the bottom right is the axial view of the
group average. Circles indicate the most signiﬁcant voxels for each individual and for the
group. Reproduced with permission of Michael B. Miller.

and NL are pretty far as well. Thus, 5 of 9 subjects whose scans were averaged to
create the “normal” group average seem “abnormal.” In cases like these, to say that
an individual is abnormal does not mean much at all. This demonstration indicates
that the source of any comparison scans must also be scrutinized as critically as the
individual scan that is compared to the average or norm.
These diﬀerent patterns of activation in normal subjects are not a statistical
glitch: activations can be fairly stable across time for a given individual, even when
that individual varies far from the group average (Miller et al. 2002). Diﬀerent
people may simply process the same information diﬀerently, even when none is
“abnormal” in any way that would be relevant to criminal responsibility. The range
of individual variability in functional architecture poses a real problem for using
functional scans to determine abnormalities in individuals that would be relevant
to legal issues.
4.2 Base rates and false alarms
Even if we can identify certain functional patterns as abnormal, we still need to
determine which individual defendants display that abnormal pattern. The problem
here is that functional abnormalities that remove criminal responsibility are likely
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to be rare. When the base rate is low in this way, even a fairly high speciﬁcity (that
is, a low rate of false alarms) will yield a high number of false alarms. To illustrate
this problem, consider a population of 10,000 with a 1% base rate of a functional
abnormality that leads to murder. (Luckily, this is an overestimate.) That means that
100 people in the population have the relevant functional abnormality and 9,900 do
not. If an fMRI test for this functional abnormality has 95% speciﬁcity, then it will
still test positive in 5% of the 9900 who lack that abnormality, which is 495 false
alarms – 495 people who test positive but do not really have the relevant functional
abnormality. Thus, even if the fMRI test is 100% sensitive, a positive test result still
has a predictive value of only 100/595, which is less than 17%.
This low predictive value of a single positive test for a functional abnormality
can be improved by additional tests, but only if the defense allows (or the court
requires) those additional tests to be conducted. If the defense gets a positive result
that they think supports their claim that the defendant is not fully responsible, then
they might be unwilling to subject the defendant to further testing. That will make
it diﬃcult in practice to improve upon the low predictive value.
Of course, the predictive value will be greater if the base rate is greater,
so defenders of fMRI evidence will point out that the base rate of relevant
abnormalities among criminal defendants could be much higher than the base rate
in the population as a whole. Bayesian calculations will then yield a higher predictive
value for the higher base rate. However, we do not know any base rate for criminal
defendants to have a functional abnormality that leads to murder. It is hard to see
how we could reasonably guess the base rate, especially since we cannot assume the
guilt of defendants in criminal trials. That makes it hard to overcome this problem
of false alarms given low base rates.
4.3 Probability of behavior
Even if the defense can prove a functional abnormality in a particular defendant,
what matters to law is not brain function but behavior, and abnormal brain
function does not necessarily make abnormal behavior likely. Numerous studies
reveal that brain damage, particularly in the frontal lobe, can be associated with
increased aggressive or antisocial behavior, but the overall prevalence of actual
violent crime in these studies is still small. For example, in a large study (including
brain scans) of Vietnam Veterans with head injury, 14% of subjects with injury
to the frontal lobe engaged in ﬁghts or damaged property, compared with about
4% of controls without head injury. Increased aggression was more likely to be
present if there was evidence of damage to the medial or orbital areas of the frontal
cortex (Grafman et al. 1996). This and other studies establish that damage to the
frontal lobes, particularly the medial or orbitofrontal cortex, can lead to abnormal
executive function, particularly dyscontrol that could increase the chances for
future impulsive behavior or aggression. However, these studies show only an
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increase above baseline. The increased probability is still low. No study to date
has reliably demonstrated a characteristic pattern of frontal lobe dysfunction based
on behavioral measures or brain scanning that is predictive of a loss of control or
the emergence of violent crime that is applicable to an individual case.
In addition to all of the abnormal brains without violent behavior, there are also,
of course, many people with normal brains who commit violent crimes. Thus, we
cannot infer the conclusion that a defendant’s brain is probably abnormal from
the premise that he committed a violent crime any more than we can infer the
conclusion that a defendant will probably commit a violent crime from the premise
that his brain is abnormal.
4.4 Causation
Even if the defendant has a functional abnormality that is correlated with violent
crime, correlation does not prove causation. Functional brain scans reveal only
correlations, so we need additional evidence before we can conclude that any
functional abnormality played a causal role in the production of criminal behavior.
Causation can reasonably be inferred in rare cases of brain abnormality. Burns &
Swerdlow (2003) describe a 40-year old male with little previous use of pornography
and no prior sexual deviance. In 2000, he started to use pornography, then child
pornography, and eventually he molested his step-daughter. He was arrested,
convicted, and required to choose between prison and a twelve-step in-patient
program for sex oﬀenders. Inside the program, he propositioned staﬀ members,
so he had to be removed. While awaiting sentencing to prison, he experienced
headaches, dysgraphia, and loss of coordination, so his brain was scanned, and
an egg-sized tumor was found. The tumor was removed, at which point he lost
his symptoms, including his deviant sexual desires. Ten months later, however,
he started to collect pornography again, and it was discovered that the tumor had
grown back. When a behavior comes and goes with the presence of a tumor in this
way, then it is reasonable to infer causation.
What is striking about this case is how unusual it is. Almost no other reported
cases explicitly relate sexual deviance to frontal lobe damage. Moreover, we rarely
get to observe the behavior come and go with the tumor. When all the evidence
we have is functional brain scans, then we do not have enough evidence to infer
causation.
4.5 Control
Finally, even if the defendant has a functional abnormality that causes a violent
crime, causation still might not be relevant to the precise legal issue at stake. For
example, suppose a defendant asks to introduce a brain image as evidence that he
lacked the kind of control that is necessary for criminal responsibility according
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to one clause in the Model Penal Code version of the insanity defense. To be
relevant to this particular legal issue, it is not enough for the brain image to reveal
an abnormality that caused the criminal behavior. Instead, that brain abnormality
would need to indicate a lack of control that is relevant to this speciﬁc defense.
Even if a brain abnormality creates a desire that causes the defendant to act, the
defendant still might be able to stop himself from acting on that desire. In this
case, the defendant would have control over his conduct and, therefore, would
meet the pertinent control condition for criminally responsibility.
Some neural abnormalities do remove control. An epileptic seizure, for example,
can cause someone’s hand to hit someone else in the face, but this case would not
even pass a voluntary act requirement. In contrast, other neural abnormalities are
compatible with control over conduct that they cause. Consider thrill seekers who
jump out of airplanes (with parachutes), jump oﬀ bridges (with bungee cords), ski
down triple black diamond slopes or drive racing cars. There is some evidence
that thrill seekers have a common neural abnormality (in the statistical sense) that
creates the desires that cause them to do acts that most other people would never
consider doing. Assume that is true. These thrill seekers still do not lack control.
They can stop themselves from acting on their impulses when it is dangerous to
themselves or others.
Analogously, when neural abnormalities create desires to do illegal acts, people
with those abnormalities still might be able to stop themselves. All of us have some
desires to do acts that we know we ought not to do, and we stop ourselves. We are
excused only when we cannot stop ourselves. However, brain scans alone cannot
reveal an inability to control oneself. To show that, we would need to know a great
deal more about the nature of control systems and how they interact with systems
involved in motivation and desire. We would also need to know retrospectively
how control systems were related to the particular defendant’s behavior at the time
of the crime.
4.6 Conclusions on probative value
None of these problems shows that fMRI brain images cannot ever be relevant to
issues of criminal responsibility. Indeed, we can easily imagine circumstances where
they would become relevant as markers of some cognitive or behavioral disability.
Moreover, as we have said, how probative brain images are will vary with the legal
facts that they are supposed to be probative of, as well as with the generation and
interpretation of the images and the accuracy of comparisons and inferences.
At present, however, the probative value of brain images for behavioral control
as a condition of criminal responsibility seems minimal on Allen et al.’s scale
of highly/somewhat/minimally probative, because, as we argued, (1) functional
normality is dubious in light of individual diﬀerences, (2) false alarms are numerous
because of low base rates, (3) criminal behavior is unlikely even with functional
abnormalities, (4) correlations cannot show that abnormalities cause particular
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criminal acts, and (5) even causation by a brain abnormality does not prove any
lack of control that would remove criminal responsibility. The probative value
of functional brain images for criminal responsibility might be higher for other
uses or at some later time, but the problems that we listed will have to be
overcome.
5. A R E B R A I N I M A G E S DA N G E R O U S?

According to FRE 403, if brain images are only minimally probative, then they
should not be admitted as legal evidence if their probative value is substantially
outweighed by any of the dangers listed in FRE 403: “. . . [1] unfair prejudice,
[2] confusion of the issues, or [3] misleading the jury, or [4] by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” (our
emphasis) Evidence that creates any of these four dangers is sometimes described
as prejudicial. This terminology can be confusing, however, because prejudice is
itself one of the four dangers. Hence, we will instead use the term “dangerous” to
describe evidence that creates any of the listed dangers.
The four speciﬁc dangers are not deﬁned in the Federal Rules of Evidence, but
Allen et al. (2006, 138–41) explain them in this way: Evidence is prejudicial to the
extent that it leads the jury to decide a case on an improper basis. (The Advisory
Committee note to FRE 403 says that this improper basis is “commonly, though
not necessarily, an emotional one,” such as dislike or pity for the defendant.)
Evidence is confusing to the extent that it focuses the jury’s attention on collateral or
inessential issues (such as how the defendant’s brain damage occurred). Evidence
is misleading to the extent that it leads the jury to draw a mistaken inference (such as
that the defendant felt an irresistible impulse). Evidence is needless if other evidence
is easier or cheaper to present and reliable enough by itself.
Do brain images create these dangers? The answer depends, of course, on their
particular context and use, so we will continue to focus on uses of functional brain
images in criminal trials to reduce responsibility. Even for this particular context
and use, the answer is not clear at this time. Some studies do suggest some dangers
of brain images, but none of the existing studies is directly on point, because none
of them tests the impact of brain images in anything like the environment of a real
trial. Still, it is worth running through a few of these studies in order to clarify what
would be needed to evaluate the possible dangers of brain images.
5.1 Pictures
In the ﬁrst study, Bright & Goodman-Delahunty (2006) had subjects read and issue
verdicts in ﬁctional criminal cases. Some of their subjects saw no photographs,
but other subjects saw either gruesome photographs or neutral photographs, such
as photographs of scratches on the door that had been jimmied open. Bright
& Goodman-Delahunty found that the conviction rate with neutral photographs
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(38%) was almost as high as with gruesome photographs (41%) and much higher
than with no photographs (8.8%), even though the neutral photographs added
no new information that would have justiﬁed conviction. This result suggests
that photographs as a form of presentation might inﬂuence jurors more than the
content of the photographs, such as whether the photographs were gruesome
or neutral. The photographs in this study had nothing to do with the brain, but
this study raises suspicions about whether brain images might have similar eﬀects
if they are confused with photographs. One of us has suggested that people’s
misapprehension of brain images as photographs could aﬀect the epistemic status
they attribute to brain images as a source of evidence (Roskies, 2007; cf. also Dumit
2004).
5.2 Neurobabble
A second study tested the eﬀects of information about the brain without
accompanying visual images. Weisberg et al. (2008) had subjects assess good and
bad explanations with and without neurobabble (our term for nonsensical or
irrelevant brain information). In one example, subjects read this:
Researchers created a list of facts that about 50% of people knew. Subjects in this
experiment read the list of facts and had to say which ones they knew. Then they had
to judge what percentage of other people would know those facts. Researchers found
that the subjects responded diﬀerently about other people’s knowledge of a fact when
the subjects themselves knew that fact. If the subjects did know a fact, they said that
an inaccurately large percentage of others would know it, too. For example, if a subject
already knew that Hartford was the capital of Connecticut, that subject might say that
80% of people would know this, even though the correct answer is 50%. The researchers
call this ﬁnding “the curse of knowledge.”

Subjects then read explanations of this reported phenomenon. Some explanations
included no neuroscience, like this one:
The researchers claim this curse happens because subjects make more mistakes when
they have to judge the knowledge of others. People are much better at judging what
they themselves know.

Other subjects received the same explanation with added neurobabble (italicized
here):
Brain scans indicate that this curse happens because of the frontal lobe brain circuitry known
to be involved in self-knowledge. Subjects make more mistakes when they have to judge the
knowledge of others. People are much better at judging what they themselves know.

Both of these explanations, like the other “bad” explanations in the study, were
supposed to be “circular restatements of the phenomenon, hence, not explanatory”
(471). Crucially, the added neurobabble does not make the explanation any
better. Nonetheless, Weisberg et al. found that bad explanations were rated more
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“satisfying” when accompanied by irrelevant neurobabble (means = 0.16 and 0.2)
than without neurobabble (means = –0.73 and –1.1) in their ﬁrst two experiments
(with novices and neuroscience students, respectively). This ﬁnding suggests that
irrelevant and nonsensical neurobabble confuses and misleads in the senses deﬁned
above.
Of course, this does not show that accurate and useful neuroscience confuses or
misleads. Moreover, this study is not about brain images, since only words about
neuroscience were added (though sometimes the words referred to brain images).
Still, this study raises suspicions that jurors might be confused and misled by expert
witnesses who add irrelevant neuroscience to their testimony.
5.3 Brain images
The next study is more directly relevant to our topic because it adds neural
information and brain images. McCabe and Castel (2008) had subjects read articles
with bad arguments, such as “Watching TV helps with math ability because both
activate the temporal lobe.” These articles included either brain images, bar graphs,
or neither. McCabe and Castel found that subjects rated the articles as making
more sense when accompanied by brain images (2.9) than when accompanied by
only a bar graph (2.7) or by neither (2.7). This eﬀect might not be large, and it
does not involve legal cases, but it is statistically signiﬁcant, and it suggests that
brain images can confuse and mislead people about the value of arguments. This
suggestion receives further support from McCabe and Castel’s second study, which
found similar results with brain images compared to topographical maps of brain
activation that were just as visually complex as the brain images but did not look
like pictures of brains.
5.4 NGRI verdicts
The ﬁnal study discussed here introduces brain images in legal cases. Gurley and
Marcus (2008) asked subjects to read about a violent crime and then decide whether
the defendant should be found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Some
subjects read about expert testimony that the defendant had a psychosis, whereas
others read about expert testimony that the defendant had psychopathy. Some
subjects read expert testimony about traumatic brain injury, but others did not.
Some subjects were shown brain images suggesting damage in the frontal lobes,
whereas others were not shown any brain images. Gurley and Marcus found
that the percentage of subjects who found the defendant NGRI after reading
expert testimony on mental disorder (psychopathy/psychosis) was higher when
accompanied by a brain image (19/37%), by testimony about traumatic brain injury
(27/43%), or by both (44/50%) than when subjects received neither (11/22%).
Thus, the introduction of both testimony about traumatic brain injury and images
of brain damage increased the NGRI rate from 11% to 44% in the case of
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psychopathy. That is a big eﬀect, so brain images and neuroscience do seem to
aﬀect legal decisions.

5.5 Problems
Not so quick! Although these studies are suggestive, they are hardly conclusive.
All of these studies face several problems before we can infer anything about the
dangers listed in FRE 403. First, brain scans might inform and increase accuracy
instead of misleading. After all, nothing in the Gurley and Marcus study shows
which rate of NGRI is correct. In that study, brain images and testimony increased
the rate of NGRI, but that is good if the defendant really deserved to be found
NGRI. Evidence is not confusing or misleading if it increases accuracy.
A second problem with concluding that brain scans are dangerous is that the
above studies test only certain kinds of people in certain kinds of circumstances.
Lab subjects diﬀer from real jurors in important ways: Real jurors are not all college
students. Real jurors are not located in labs or classroom. Real jurors hear more
details of each case. Real jurors know that real lives are aﬀected. Real jurors hear
both sides of an argument including the cross-examination. Real jurors deliberate
and know that they are accountable to other jurors insofar as they will probably be
asked to give reasons for their beliefs and decisions. Because of such diﬀerences,
we cannot quickly draw precise conclusions about real jurors from studies about
lab subjects.
Some studies (Bornstein 1999) have found that decisions by student and nonstudent mock jurors did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Still, we cannot know whether the
special circumstances of real jurors reduce or nullify the eﬀects of brain images in
particular until we study subjects in circumstances more like those of real juries.

5.6 An attempted solution
We will probably never be able to obtain useful data from real jurors in real
trials. Still, we can try to make the circumstances of actual jurors and experimental
subjects as close as possible in respects that are likely to aﬀect the issue at hand.
In particular, it would be better to draw subjects from juror pools (rather than just
students), re-enact real cross-examination of experts or closing arguments along
with jury instructions in detail (rather than short summaries), measure inclinations
during the re-enactment (to see how each bit of evidence makes jurors lean one
way or the other), ask for verdicts before and after deliberation (to see how much
deliberation aﬀects verdicts), and ask not just for verdicts but also for knowledge
and memory of relevant facts (to see whether images are confusing or misleading
by distracting jurors from crucial facts). In this setup, we can compare verdicts
and correct answers by subjects who view the re-enactment (a) with brain images
as well as expert testimony, (b) with neuroscientiﬁc information presented by
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experts but without brain images, and (c) with neither brain images nor any other
neuroscientiﬁc information.
This design still has ﬂaws. Subjects still know that no real lives or freedom hangs
on their decisions. (It is hard to imagine a solution to this problem that would get
past human subjects review committees.) We will also not be able to reproduce all
of the details during a real trial, especially lengthy cross-examination, because not
enough subjects will volunteer for that long. Despite these problems, our proposed
study will, we hope, give more and better information about how juries react to
brain images.
6. C O N C L U S I O N S

Unfortunately, we do not have any data from our study yet. Hence, our conclusions
must all be tentative and conditional. Still, we can draw three kinds of conclusions.
6.1 Scientific conclusions
We argued above that current fMRI brain images are only minimally probative
of control as a condition of criminal responsibility because of issues inherent in
both the technology and in the assessment of the brain basis of control capacity.
Of course, brain images might be more probative of other legal issues, and their
probative value might increase as techniques improve. Advances on the horizon
include pattern classiﬁers and new ways to base individual predictions on group
data given knowledge of individual diﬀerences (cf. Haynes and Rees 2006).
On the other side of the scale, we do not yet know whether or how much brain
images are confusing or misleading to jurors. There is some reason to suspect
that they are, but the simple studies reported so far do not show whether more
detail along with cross-examination will undermine any tendency of brain images
to confuse and mislead. We need better studies to determine how dangerous brain
images are in various circumstances.
6.2 Legal conclusions
Because of the scientiﬁc uncertainties, our legal conclusion has to be conditional: If
brain images are as confusing and misleading in trial contexts as they seem to be in
reported experiments, and if they lack much probative value because they cannot
overcome the problems listed above, then their moderate dangers “substantially
outweigh” their minimal probative value, so brain images fail the balancing test of
FRE 403 and should not be admitted into trials. That is a lot of “if”, but it is all that
we can conclude for now.
It is also worth recalling that brain scans still might be admissible in some
situations, such as capital sentencing, where the defense is strongly favored and
the admissibility standards are much more lax. This is where they seem to be most
regularly admitted now, and this practice seems to rest on the traditional value
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judgment that it is particularly horrible to ﬁnd someone guilty who is innocent or
who has not been given every reasonable chance to defend himself or herself.
6.3 Philosophical conclusions
Although we have not emphasized these issues, we hope our discussion has made
it clear that what counts as evidence and whether evidence is strong enough for
beliefs and decisions to be justiﬁed depends not just on pure probabilities but
also on values, including costs of errors. In addition, gathering and assessing
legal evidence from neuroscience is a social task that requires many people from
diﬀerent ﬁelds: neuroscientists and lawyers. One lesson for philosophers, then, is
that epistemology needs to become both normative and social if it is to become
applicable to the ways in which real people go about gaining knowledge, such as in
our legal system.
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